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Abstract
Some charities are much more cost-effective than other charities, which means that they can save many more lives with the
same amount of money. Yet most donations do not go to the most effective charities. Why is that? We hypothesized that part
of the reason is that people underestimate how much more effective the most effective charities are compared with the average
charity. Thus, they do not know how much more good they could do if they donated to the most effective charities. We studied
this hypothesis using samples of the general population, students, experts, and effective altruists in six studies. We found that
lay people estimated that among charities helping the global poor, the most effective charities are 1.5 times more effective than
the average charity (Studies 1 and 2). Effective altruists, in contrast, estimated the difference to be factor 30 (Study 3) and
experts estimated the factor to be 100 (Study 4). We found that participants donated more to the most effective charity, and less
to an average charity, when informed about the large difference in cost-effectiveness (Study 5). In conclusion, misconceptions
about the difference in effectiveness between charities is thus likely one reason, among many, why people donate ineffectively.
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1 Introduction
People donate large sums to charity every year. US charita-
ble giving amounted to $410 Billion in 2017: more than 2%
of GDP (Giving USA, 2018). Thus, people make significant
sacrifices in order to help others. Yet, their help is often much
less impactful than it could be. An increasing number of crit-
ics have argued that most people donate ineffectively—that
they donate to charities which save fewer lives, or in other
ways do less good, than the most (cost-)effective charities
(Fiennes, 2017; MacAskill, 2015). This contrasts with self-
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interested behavior: e.g., people more frequently choose the
most effective option when investing (for their own benefit)
than when donating (for others’ benefit) (Berman, Barasch,
Levine & Small, 2018). There is a puzzle here: the puzzle of
ineffective giving. If people make sacrifices in order to help
others, why do they not help others more effectively (An-
dreoni, 1990; Bergh & Reinstein, 2020; Berman et al., 2018;
Caviola, Schubert, Nemirow, 2020; FeldmanHall, Dalgleish,
Evans & Mobbs, 2015; Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson &
Norton, 2012; Karlan & Wood, 2017; Metzger & Günther,
2015; Null, 2011; Verkaik, 2016)? In this paper, we study
a hypothesis which could partly explain the puzzle of inef-
fective giving: that people underestimate the difference in
effectiveness between charities.
In recent years, many scholars have argued that some
forms of helping are substantially more effective than others
(MacAskill, 2015; Ord, 2013; Singer, 2009, 2015). In par-
ticular, the nascent effective altruism movement, pioneered
by academic philosophers, has argued that the differences
in charity effectiveness are large, and that that is part of the
reason why it is so important to donate to the most effec-
tive charities (MacAskill, 2015; Ord, 2013; Pummer, 2016;
Singer, 2009, 2015). An oft-used example involves two in-
terventions aimed at mitigating blindness that different char-
ities implement. Trachoma surgeries to prevent blindness
have been estimated to cost less than $50, whereas training
a guide dog to help a person who is already blind has been
estimated to cost $50,000 (Colby, 2017; Jamison et al., 2006;
Ord, 2013). This means that the money spent on training a
single guide dog could have funded trachoma surgeries that
would have prevented one thousand people from going blind
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in the first place. So if the goal is to mitigate problems asso-
ciated with blindness — including both mitigation of current
blindness and prevention of potential blindness — then tra-
choma surgery is far more effective. It seems plausible that
most people do not know about these big differences in ef-
fectiveness, and this lack of knowledge could reduce their
tendency to donate to the most effective charities.
Just like donors, social scientists interested in charitable
giving have for the most part neglected the issue of quality,
or effectiveness, of giving, instead focusing on how much
people give—the quantity of giving (Bekkers & Wiepking,
2011; van Leeuwen & Wiepking, 2013). But recent years
have seen an increased interest in why people give ineffec-
tively (Baron & Szymanska, 2011; Berman et al., 2018;
Caviola, Faulmüller, Everett, Savulescu & Kahane, 2014;
Karlan & Wood, 2017; Metzger & Günther, 2015; Null,
2011; Verkaik, 2016). There are two main types of explana-
tions for why people do not donate effectively: motivational
and cognitive/epistemic explanations (Berman et al., 2018,
Caviola, Schubert & Nemirow, 2020). Motivational expla-
nations posit that people do not want to donate effectively,
or that they just have a weak preference for donating effec-
tively, which can be overridden by other preferences. For
instance, people may not want to deliberate too much when
donating, because deliberate donors are seen as less reliable
cooperation partners (Montealegre, Bush, Moss, Pizarro &
Jimenez-Leal, 2020; Rand, 2016). And lack of deliberation
leads to ineffective giving. Similarly, it has been suggested
that people prefer donating to charities that they have a sub-
jective preference for (e.g., cancer charities) over more effec-
tive charities (e.g., charities focusing on neglected tropical
diseases) and that they do not want to seek information about
charities’ effectiveness (Berman et al., 2018).
Cognitive/epistemic explanations, on the other hand, say
that people donate ineffectively because of cognitive or epis-
temic shortcomings: because they do not know how to do-
nate effectively. Most of the existing research on cogni-
tive/epistemic explanations of ineffective giving has focused
on general cognitive biases. They include insensitivity to the
number of people saved (scope neglect; Dickert, Västfjäll,
Kleber & Slovic, 2015) and the tendency to focus on what
proportion of people one can save, rather than on the absolute
numbers (proportion dominance; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic,
Johnson & Friedrich, 1997). These biases cause people to
process information about charities and giving opportunities
in ways that can lead to ineffective giving.
We suggest an additional epistemic explanation, which
has received less attention: that people have misconceptions
about charitable giving. This misconception explanation
suggests that the problem is not that people process avail-
able information incorrectly, but rather that they do not even
start with correct information. In previous work we have al-
ready explored this misconception explanation (Caviola et al.
2020). Here, we study a new hypothesized misconception:
that people underestimate the difference in effectiveness be-
tween the most effective charities and charities of average
effectiveness. Specifically, we focus on charities that help
the world’s poorest people. We also hypothesize that this
misconception affects giving behavior. If people believe that
the difference in effectiveness between charities is low, then
they may find it less important to donate to the most effective
charities. Therefore, it seems plausible that this misconcep-
tion could be a cause of ineffective giving.
We study our hypotheses about lay misconceptions about
charity effectiveness and their effects on giving behavior
across five studies. In Studies 1–4, we test whether lay peo-
ple hold the hypothesized misconception by comparing lay
people’s and experts’ beliefs about the difference in effec-
tiveness between the most effective charities and charities
of average effectiveness. In Studies 5, we study whether
informing lay people about the differences in effectiveness
between the most effective and an average charity affects
their giving behavior.
Reports of all measures, manipulations, data (including
exclusions), analysis code, and experimental materials in all
studies are available for download at: https://osf.io/k4zfr/.
2 Study 1
Study 1 tested lay people’s beliefs about the difference in ef-
fectiveness between the most effective charities and charities
of average effectiveness that aim to help the world’s poorest
people.
2.1 Method
Participants. We recruited 210 US American participants
via Amazon MTurk. Forty-two were excluded because they
did not complete an attention check question correctly or
because they said that a charity of average level of cost-
effectiveness is more effective than a charity of the highest
level of cost-effectiveness. The final sample consisted of 168
participants (89 females, age M = 38.85, SD = 11.63).
Procedure. Participants first read an explanation of the
concept of cost-effectiveness, then the read about two chari-
ties:
Some charities that help the world’s poorest peo-
ple are more cost-effective than others. Cost-
effectiveness (in our example here) is measured by
the number of lives saved. A more cost-effective
charity can save more lives than a less cost-
effective charity can save with the same amount
of money.
Among all the charities that help the world’s poor-
est people.
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• Charity A has the highest level of cost-
effectiveness
• Charity B has an average level of cost-
effectiveness.
Subsequently, participants answered three questions probing
their estimates of differences in cost-effectiveness between
Charity A and Charity B:
1. Tipping point: “Imagine that Charity A receives $1000,
which it uses to save a certain number of lives. How
much money would Charity B need to receive, in order
to save the same number of lives as Charity A?”
2. Explicit comparison: “How many times more cost-
effective do you believe Charity A is in comparison
to Charity B?”
3. Cost per life ratio: “How much do you think it would
cost a charity of highest level cost-effectiveness [char-
ity of average level cost-effectiveness] to prevent one
person in a poor country from dying? (In US dollars)”
To calculate the cost per life ratio, we divided the partici-
pants’ estimate of the cost-effectiveness of a charity with the
highest level of cost-effectiveness by that of a charity with
an average level of cost-effectiveness.
Participants also responded to a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire, which included a question about how much they
donated to charity last year. Another question asked par-
ticipants what proportion of charities they believe have the
highest level of cost-effectiveness, defined as at least 90% as
effective as the most effective charity, and what proportion
have an average level of effectiveness, defined as between
10% more and 10% less effective than the average charity.
We also asked participants how knowledgeable about char-
ities they believe they are and whether they have heard of
Effective Altruism or GiveWell before. Finally, participants
responded to demographic questions.
2.2 Results
The results were convergent (see Table 1): the median ratio
was 1.5 for Tipping point, 2 for Explicit comparison and 1.6
for Cost per life ratio. Surprisingly, we also found that the
median participant believed that the most cost-effective char-
ity can save a life for $100, and that the average charity can
save a life for $150. Both figures are substantially lower than
estimates from the expert charity evaluator GiveWell, which
suggest that the most cost-effective charities can save a life
for approximately $2,000 (GiveWell, 2020). There were no
differences in the reported cost-effectiveness ratios between
donors (i.e., participants who donated at least something to
charity in the previous year; 81.5% of them) and non-donors,
t(136) = 0.99, p = .32.
We found that participants on average thought that 21.74%
of charities had the highest level of cost-effectiveness, and
47.89% had an average level of cost-effectiveness. 16 out of
168 participants (9.5%) reported having heard of Effective
Altruism, 133 (79.2%) had not heard of it and 19 (11.3%)
were not sure. Seventeen participants (10.1%) reported hav-
ing heard of GiveWell, 134 (79.8%) had not heard of it and
17 (10.1 %) were not sure. There were no noteworthy cor-
relations between the dependent variables and the follow-up
or demographic measures.
3 Study 2
In Study 2, we tested whether the findings from Study 1
would replicate with a sample that differed from the first
sample in terms of nationality, age and education.
3.1 Method
Participants. We recruited 208 students on the University
of Oxford campus. Eight were excluded either because they
did not complete the attention check question correctly or
because they did not complete the full study, leaving a final
sample of 200 people (118 females; age M = 24.31, SD =
7.68).
Procedure. Participants read the explanation of the con-
cept of cost-effectiveness from Study 1, before answering
the Tipping Point question from Study 1. We included just
one question because there were no noteworthy differences
among the three questions we used in Study 1. Participants
then answered questions that were part of another, unrelated,
study.
3.2 Results
We found that the median response was a cost-effectiveness
ratio of 2 (see Table 1), which is similar to the results from
Study 1.
4 Study 3
In Study 3, we studied beliefs about differences in cost-
effectiveness between charities among members of the effec-
tive altruism community (MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015).
Effective altruists are committed to doing the most good us-
ing reason and evidence (e.g., by donating to the most cost-
effective charities). We therefore wanted to find out whether
their focus on effectiveness was associated with more knowl-
edge of charity effectiveness than people in general.
4.1 Method
Participants. We distributed a questionnaire through an
online survey of effective altruists. The survey was dis-
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Table 1: Estimates of the cost-effectiveness ratio between the most effective and average charities. Participants in four
different studies estimated how much more the most effective charities are compared with an average charity, through three
different questions: Tipping point, Explicit comparison, and Cost per life ratio. Note that only the Explicit comparison question
probed these estimates directly, however. The Tipping Point question concerned how much money Charity B would need
in order to save as many lives as Charity A could save with $1,000, whereas the Cost per life ratio concerned how much it
would cost a charity of highest level of cost-effectiveness [average level of cost-effectiveness] to prevent one person in a poor
country from dying. In those cases, the estimated cost-effectiveness ratios were inferred from participants’ responses.
M (SD) Min 25th % Median 75th % Max
Study 1 (MTurk sample, n = 168):
Tipping point 1.63 (0.49) 1.00 1.30 1.50 2.00 5.00
Explicit comparison 9.32 (23) 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.85 200
Cost per life ratio 597 (7,715) 1.00 1.50 1.60 2.00 100,000
Study 2 (Oxford students, n = 200):
Tipping point 56 (737) 1.00 1.50 2.00 4.00 10,000
Study 3 (Effective Altruists, n = 861):
Tipping point 1026 (3·1027) 1.00 10 50 100 1029
Study 4 (Experts, n = 45):
Explicit comparison 10,857 (66,997) 1.96 14 100 200 450,000
tributed via a number of channels including the Effective
Altruist Newsletter, the Effective Altruist Forum and various
effective altruist Facebook groups. In total, 2601 partici-
pants participated in the survey. The question of interest for
this study was placed in the optional part towards the end of
the survey, which was completed by 1139 participants. Of
these 278 were excluded for either failing a comprehension
check or entering a value that was not a number, leaving us
with a final sample of 861.
Procedure. Participants read the explanation of the con-
cept of cost-effectiveness from Study 1, before answering
the Tipping Point question. They also answered a number
of questions relating to other studies before and after the
questions relating to the current paper.
4.2 Results
The median participant estimated that the most cost-effective
charity was 50 times more cost-effective than an average
charity — much higher than the estimates from Studies 1
and 2.
5 Study 4
In Study 4 we asked global poverty experts to estimate the
differences in cost-effectiveness between charities helping
the global poor. We take this expert estimate as the best
available estimate of the true difference in cost-effectiveness
between the most effective and average charities.
5.1 Method
Participants. We selected experts in areas relevant to the
estimation of global poverty charity effectiveness, in areas
such as health economics, international development and
charity measurement and evaluation. The experts were iden-
tified through searches in published academic literature on
global poverty intervention effectiveness and among profes-
sional organizations working in charity evaluation. We also
let respondents identify other relevant experts in the field;
so-called “snowball sampling” (Berg, 2006). We recruited
78 participants, but 33 did not complete the survey or in-
dicated that they were not experts, leaving us with a final
sample of 45 participants.
Procedure. The experts were given the Explicit compari-
son question from Study. We informed them that the Explicit
comparison question was designed for lay people, and that
it therefore could be underspecified. The participants were
therefore asked to interpret this question to the best of their
abilities. They also responded to a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire.
5.2 Results and Discussion
We found that their median response was a cost-effectiveness
ratio of 100 (see Table 1). This number is much higher than
the numbers we found in Studies 1 and 2. Even the 25th
percentile expert estimate (14) was much higher than the
75th percentile lay person estimate (≤ 4), which suggests that
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experts converged on thinking that lay people’s estimates are
too low.
6 Study 5
Studies 1–4 together provided evidence that lay people do
indeed underestimate how much more effective the most ef-
fective charities are compared to the average charity. In
Study 5, we studied whether correcting this misconception
would lead to more effective giving. Our hypothesis was that
when people were correctly informed about the large differ-
ences in charities’ effectiveness, they would donate more to
a highly effective charity, and less to a charity of average
cost-effectiveness.
6.1 Method
Participants. We recruited 423 US American participants
from MTurk (185 females, age M = 38.40, SD = 12.08).
None were excluded.
Procedure. Participants were divided into three condi-
tions: control, 1.5 ratio and 100 ratio. In the 1.5 and 100
ratio conditions, participants were informed that “in a recent
report, researchers concluded that the most cost-effective
charities are [1.5/100] times more effective than a charity of
average level of cost-effectiveness”. In the control condi-
tion, no such information about the cost-effectiveness ratio
was given. Next, participants of all conditions were pre-
sented with two hypothetical charities (Charity A and Char-
ity B). The charities were described to focus on “helping
people in an African town who are at risk of a mosquito-
borne infection called Chikungunya [West Nile Virus] by
distributing the medicine Doxycycline [Lariam].” The char-
ities’ descriptions were randomized, i.e., either Charity A
focused on Chikungunya using Doxycycline and Charity B
on West Nile Virus using Lariam, or vice versa. Partici-
pants were informed that “Among all the charities that help
the world’s poorest people, Charity A has the highest level
of cost-effectiveness and Charity B has an average level of
cost-effectiveness.”
Next, participants were asked how they would allocate
a hypothetical donation of $100 between the two charities.
They could choose between two options: 1) $100 to Charity
A and $0 to Charity B, 2) $60 to Charity A and $40 to Charity
B. We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to
give the full amount to the highly effective charity when told
the effectiveness ratio was 100, whereas they would still want
to give at least some amount to the average charity when told
the effectiveness ratio was only 1.5. We hypothesized that
people in the control condition would give similar responses
as in the 1.5 ratio condition because their implicit assumption
about the effectiveness ratio would roughly match factor 1.5,
in line with in our previous studies.
6.2 Results and Discussion
Our hypothesis was supported. The percentage of partici-
pants who gave the full amount to the highly effective charity
was 37.3% (53 of 142) in the control condition, 38.0% (52
of 137) in the 1.5 ratio condition, and 55.6% (80 of 144)
in the 100 ratio condition. A logistic regression revealed
that the increase in percentage who gave the full amount to
the highly effective charity from the 1.5 ratio condition to
the 100 ratio condition was statistically significant (Exp(B) =
−0.71, z = −2.94, p = .003), whereas there was no significant
difference between the 1.5 ratio condition and the control
condition (Exp(B) = .03, z = 0.11, p = .91).
We know from previous research that when presented with
multiple charities, people have an inclination to split their
donations (Sharps & Schroeder, 2018). They tend to split
their donations even in cases where they could do more good
by giving everything to the more effective charity (Baron
& Szymanska, 2011; Caviola et al., 2020). Our finding
that many participants split their donations between a highly
effective and an average charity is in line with that. However,
as we saw, the tendency to split donations was reduced when
the difference in effectiveness between these two charities
was said to be large.
One possible explanation is that people’s desire to split
(e.g., due to fairness concerns) is outweighed by a stronger
desire for effectiveness when the difference in effectiveness
is large. Another explanation could be that people falsely
assume that the most effective allocation is to give X times
more (i.e., either 1.5 or 100) to the more effective charity
if the charity is X times more effective. Thus, they may
fail to realize that the marginal value of every additional
dollar is always higher when given to the more effective
charity, even in cases where the difference in effectiveness
between the two charities is small (Baron & Szymanska,
2011). Irrespective of what explains the effect, this study
shows that at least in certain donation tasks, informing people
about the large difference between charities’ effectiveness
can increase effective giving.
More research is required to determine how much the
effect of informing people about the large difference in char-
ities’ effectiveness generalizes across contexts. It is unclear,
for example, if people would also give more effectively if
they were considering two charities that focus on completely
different causes and are thus more difficult to compare using
a single metric. In studies reported in the Supplement, we
found mixed evidence for such cases.
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7 General Discussion
We found that lay people substantially underestimate the
differences in cost-effectiveness between charities, compared
with expert estimates (Studies 1–4). Thus, people do indeed
hold a misconception about how much greater impact they
can have by donating to one of the most effective charities,
rather than to an average charity. We also found that it is
possible to dispel this misconception: if people are informed
that the cost-effectiveness ratio is larger than they thought,
they believe it. Furthermore, we found that dispelling this
misconception can lead to more effective giving. People
are more inclined to give their whole donation to a highly
effective charity, and less inclined to split it with a charity of
average effectiveness, when informed of the large difference
in charities’ effectiveness (Study 5).
Our finding adds to the list of misconceptions and prefer-
ences for ineffective charities that were revealed in previous
research (Baron & Szymanska, 2011; Berman et al., 2018;
Caviola et al., 2020). They included, e.g., misconceptions
about the effectiveness of disaster charities and local chari-
ties, and misconceptions about the effectiveness of splitting
donations between charities. They also included correspond-
ing preferences for disaster charities and local charities, and
for splitting one’s donations, even when participants were
informed that donating to those charities or in that way is
less effective. In Study 5, most of these preferences and
misconceptions did not play any role, with the exception that
misconceptions about and preferences for splitting probably
made people donate less to the most effective charity than
they otherwise would have. But when people are presented
with real donation opportunities in the real world, many of
these misconceptions and preferences will often stand in the
way of effective giving. That could reduce the effect of dis-
pelling the misconception that the difference in effectiveness
between charities is low.
On the other hand, there are also considerations point-
ing in the opposite direction, suggesting that dispelling this
particular misconception could have greater effects than our
studies suggest. That is because people who truly grasp the
significance of the large difference in charities’ effectiveness
may, besides changing their own giving behavior, also be
motivated to influence other donors. They see how much
potential impact is lost through ineffective donations, and
may therefore try to encourage more effective giving. In
fact, members of the effective altruism movement are doing
precisely that.
7.1 Why people underestimate the difference
in effectiveness between charities
Our studies focused on demonstrating that people erro-
neously believe that the difference in effectiveness between
the most effective and the average charities is small and what
effect this misconception has on their charitable giving. This
leaves open the question of why they do have this miscon-
ception.
One possibility is that people conflate overhead with ef-
fectiveness, and (probably correctly) think that the difference
between charities’ overhead expenditures are relatively mod-
est. Similarly, it is possible that most people do not consider
the fact that charities rely on different interventions (e.g., dif-
ferent types of medications) and focus on different problems
(e.g., different diseases). Since much of the difference in
effectiveness between charities stems from them employing
different interventions and addressing different problems,
this may lead to them underestimating that difference.
Another possibility is that people make a mistaken analogy
between charities and for-profits. The difference in price
for two similar products is rarely higher than factor 1.5,
because market pressures usually lead to cost-effectiveness
optimization (Mankiw, 2011). A seller whose products are
100 times more expensive than other similar products would
quickly go bankrupt. Thus, if similar market pressures were
operative on the charity “market”, one might have expected
the differences in effectiveness between charities to be low.
However, since donors do not consistently donate more to
more cost-effective charities (Karlan & Wood, 2017), there
is no equivalent market pressure in the charity sector (i.e.,
the charity market is not efficient), and as a result there
is much less cost-effectiveness optimization. This leads,
in turn, to huge differences in cost-effectiveness between
charities. Hence, the analogy fails.
Yet another possibility is that the misconception about
differences in effectiveness between charities is related to
another misconception: people’s overestimation of how ef-
fective charities are in absolute terms, which we observed in
Study 1. Since they believe that an average charity is already
extremely effective at saving lives, they might believe that
it is simply not possible for the most effective charities to
be substantially more effective. This leads to a suppressed
estimate of the difference in effectiveness between charities.
On this view, the two misconceptions are related.
To further understand why people underestimate the dif-
ference in effectiveness among charities, it may be useful to
study to what extent people have similar misconceptions in
other domains, such as regarding the relative effectiveness
of different private companies. Such studies could teach us
whether the effect that we’ve found is unique to the charitable
domain, or whether it rather reflects more domain-general
patterns.
7.2 Limitations and future research
One limitation of our research is that we studied only char-
ities focused on helping the global poor. It is possible that
people would have different beliefs about charities working
in different cause areas, such as climate change or animal
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welfare. Future research could therefore study beliefs about
charities working within those cause areas, as well as beliefs
about differences in effectiveness between charities working
in different cause areas.
Another limitation of our research is that our studies relied
only on hypothetical donations. Future research could test
whether informing people about the vast difference between
charities’ effectiveness can increase effective giving in the
real world.
7.3 Conclusions
Our research shows that lay people believe that the differ-
ence in effectiveness between charities is much smaller than
it actually is. We also found that informing them about the
median expert estimate of that difference makes them donate
more effectively in a donation task. If this finding general-
izes, then information about differences in effective giving
could be a tool to make charitable giving more effective.
Hence more research on the effects of debunking misconcep-
tions about the difference in effectiveness between charities
would be valuable.
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